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THE HISTORY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE
NINTH CIRCUIT
I.

INTRODUCTION

May 17 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Boardof Education,I a case that continues to have

an enormous impact on American society. The changes it has engendered have not occurred quietly or without public awareness. Courtordered desegregation of America's public schools has taken a variety
of forms in the quarter century since Brown, from the invalidation of
statutes imposing segregation to the mandatory busing of school children.
This note traces the development of school desegregation law in the
federal courts of the Ninth Circuit. The cases are viewed against the
background of the Supreme Court decisions that have attempted to
guide the inferior courts. There has often been no guidance on important issues. When there has been guidance, the Ninth Circuit courts
have occasionally ignored it.
II.

THE "SEPARATE BUT EQUAL" ERA

The first school segregation case to reach the federal courts in the
Ninth Circuit was Wong Him v. Callahan.2 The plaintiff was a student
"of Chinese parentage" seeking admission to a San Francisco grammar
school. He had been excluded under a California law which allowed
the establishment of separate schools for "Chinese or Mongolian children" and which restricted those children to the separate schools This
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 119 F. 381 (N.D. Cal. 1902).
3. The statute was enacted in 1885 (1885 Cal. Stats., ch. 117, p. 100), and it was not repealed until 1947 (1947 Cal. Stats., ch. 737, p. 1792), only seven years before Brown. Before
its repeal, the statute was amended to allow separate schools for Indian (1893 Cal. Stats., ch.
193, p. 253) and Japanese (1921 Cal. Stats., ch. 685, p. 1160) children. In 1928, a commentator found, however, that the law was "not generally enforced." 16 CALIF. L. REV. 346, 347

(1928). At the time of the Wong Him case, the statute read:
Every school, unless otherwise provided by law, must be open for the admission of all
children between six and twenty-one years of age residing in the district, and the Board
of School Trustees, or City Board of Education, have power to admit adults and children not residing in the district, whenever good reasons exist therefor. Trustees shall
have the power to exclude children of filthy or vicious habits, or children suffering from
contagious or infectious diseases, and also to establish separate schools for Indian children and for children of Mongolian or Chinese descent. When such separateschools are
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law was challenged as a violation of the plaintiff's right to equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution.4 The plaintiff, making an argument which was not to be
adopted by the United States Supreme Court for another fifty-two
years, urged that the operation of separate schools was per se discriminatory. Such discrimination, it was further claimed, "is arbitrary, and
the result of hatred for the Chinese race." 5
After finding that the intent of the legislature was irrelevant to the
validity of the statute, the district court refused to invalidate the law:
[I]t is well settled that the state has the right to provide separate schools
for the children of different races, and such action is not forbidden by the
fourteenth amendment to the constitution, provided the schools so established6 make no discrimination in the educational facilities which they afford.
Since the complaint had not contained any allegations of inequalities
between the separate schools, the court found that the complaint stated
no claim for which relief could be granted.
It is odd that Wong Him, a classic espousal of the "separate but
equal" doctrine, does not cite Plessy v. Ferguson7 as an authority. Decided only six years earlier, Piessy was the first comment by the
Supreme Court on whether the fourteenth amendment prohibits a state
from separating the races when the separate facilities provided by the
state are equal in quality. Ylessy had approved this segregation tactic.
And while Plessy dealt with a Louisiana statute mandating separate
railway cars for blacks and whites, it was noted in Plessy that "[tihe
most common instance of [racial separation] is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children." 8
Like the plaintiff in Wong Him, Homer Plessy argued that the maintenance of separate facilities was in and of itself discriminatory and
established,Indian, Chinese, or Mongolian children must not be admitted into any other
school; provided,that in cities and towns in which the kindergarten has been adopted,
or may hereafter be adopted, as part of the public primary schools, children may be
admitted to such kindergarten classes at the age of four years.
(emphasis added)
This law was held constitutional by the California Supreme Court in Piper v. Big Pine
School Dist., 193 Cal. 664, 671 (1924).
4. The fourteenth amendment states, in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
5. 119 F. at 382.
6. Id.
7. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8. Id at 544.
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thus a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court disagreed:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to consist in
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the
colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to
put that construction upon it.9
While Wong Him does not mention Plessy, both spring from the
same family of school segregation cases. The case that initially approved the operation of separate schools, and one that was relied upon
in both Wong Him and Plessy, was Roberts v. City of Boston.I ° There,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected the argument of Charles
Sumner, the plaintiff's attorney, that the maintenance of separate
schools in Boston for black and white children "tends to create a feeling of degradation in the blacks, and of prejudice and uncharitableness
in the whites.""
Also cited in both Wong Him and Plessy is Ward v. Flood,12 the
California equivalent of Roberts. Moreover, although Roberts was decided prior to the enactment of the fourteenth amendment, 3 Ward, a
post fourteenth amendment case, found Roberts, persuasive and quoted
from it at length while holding that a California statute establishing
separate schools for blacks" did not violate the fourteenth amendment.
The Ward court, in a passage expressing a philosophy which would be
repeated in Wong Him, stated:
[I]n the circumstances that the races are separated in the public schools,
9. Id at 551. An eloquent dissent was filed by Mr. Justice Harlan. In it he stated:
We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which, practically, puts the brand of
servitude and degradation upon a large class of our fellow citizens, our equals before
the law. The thin disguise of "equal" accommodations for passengers in railroad
coaches will not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done.
Id at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
10. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
11. Id at 204.
12. 48 Cal. 36 (1874).
13. The fourteenth amendment was added to the Constitution in 1868.
14. The Common Schools Law was amended four years before Ward to read, in part:
Sec. 53. Every school, unless otherwise provided by special law, shall be open for the
admission of all white children, between five and twenty-one years of age ....
Sec. 56. The education of children of African descent, and Indian children, shall be
provided for in separate schools.
1870 Cal. Stats., ch. 556, 838-39.
Ten years after its enactment, the law creating separate schools for blacks and Indians was
repealed. Code Amendments of 1880, ch. 44, p. 47. But, only five years later, separate
schools were again authorized, this time for Chinese and Mongolian'students. See note 3
supra.
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there is certainly to be found no violation of the constitutional rights of
the one race more than of the other, and we see none of either, for each,
equal terms with
though separated from the other, is to be educated upon
5
that other, and both at the common public expense.'

Wong Him v. Callahan was the first school segregation case in the
Ninth Circuit and one of the earliest federal cases on the subject. It did
not blaze new trails. Rather, it reflected the judicial sentiment prevailing at that time-a dual school system was not per se discriminatory
against non-white children, and the intent of the legislature in estab-

lishing such a system, even if based on racial hatred, was irrelevant.
Although it broke no new ground, Wong Him was cited with approval
by the Supreme Court in 1927 when that Court expressly affirmed the
right of a state to establish racially segregated schools.' 6 Wong Him

was still cited as an authority for the "separate but equal" doctrine as
late as 1950.17

III.

PRE-BROwN

INDEPENDENCE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT

If the Wong Him court adhered to the doctrine of stare decisis in
reaching its decision, the second Ninth Circuit district judge to examine
segregated schools felt no such constraint. In Mendez v. Westminister
School District,'" a federal court held for the first time that the maintenance of separate schools violated the fourteenth amendment.' 9 Al-

though there had been some significant changes in the Supreme Court's
segregation philosophy since the decision in Wong Him forty-four

years earlier," the Mendez decision received national attention and in
what was seen as its far-reaching and unique holding.2
15. 48 Cal. at 52.
16. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 86 (1927).
17. See Carr v. Coming, 182 F.2d 14, 17 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
18. 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946), ai'd,161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947). In the repoit of
the appellate opinion in Mendez, the defendant's name is spelled "Westminster."
19. Id at 549.
20. The Supreme Court had become more strict with the requirement that equal facilities
had to be provided if separate schools were to be maintained. See Missouri ex. rel. Gaines
v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Leflar & Davis, Segregationin the Public Schools- 1953, 67
HARv. L. REV. 377, 393 (1954).
21. See Note, 30 MINN. L. REV. 646, 646 (1946) (Mendez "extends the scope of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment further than any previous decision from the
federal courts involving educational discrimination."); Note, Segregation in Public Schools
-A Violation of "EqualProtection ofthe Laws," 56 YALE L.J. 1059, 1060 (1947) (Mendez
"questioned the basic assumption of the Plessy case and may portend a complete reversal of
the doctrine."); see also Note, Segregationin Schools as a Violation ofthe XIVIh Amendment,
47 COLUM. L. REV. 325 (1947); 60 HARv. L. REv. 1156 (1947); 42 ILLINOIs L. Ruv. 545
(1947); 23 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 403 (1948).
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Mendez was a class action by students of Mexican descent against
four school systems in Orange County, California. The four systems,
by official action or by custom, maintained separate schools for nonEnglish-speaking students for the alleged purpose of improving their
English skills to the point where they would be able to attend the English-speaking schools. At the outset, the court noted that the facilities,
curricula, and quality of teachers in the non-English schools were
"identical and in some respects superior to those in the other
schools."22 If the court had followed the long, uninterrupted line of
"separate but equal" federal cases, this fact alone would have justified
a dismissal of the complaint. However, this finding was used only to
frame the issue in the case-whether the maintenance of separate
schools, despite the equality of measurable assets, denied the equal protection of the laws to the non-English-speaking students.
To take jurisdiction over the case, the court set for itself, and satisfied
two requirements. First, there had to be alleged a violation of constitutional right. As authority for the proposition that a federal court could
intervene in the management of a state's public schools, Mendez cited
Cumming v. Board of Education,2 3 an early Supreme Court "separate
but equal" case that had held such interference impermissible "except
in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by
the supreme law of the land."'24 As additional authority on this point,
the court cited four other "separate but equal" cases, including Wong
Him and Ward, all of which had reached conclusions on the ultimate
constitutional issue contrary to that reached in Mendez. The second
prerequisite to an exercise of jurisdiction was that the actions of the
school boards be held to be those of the state. The court concluded that
a school board that has been authorized by the state to act should be
considered to be acting as the state.
In ruling that the actions of the school boards were illegal, the court
held that the segregation of Mexican children in separate educational
institutions violated California state law,25 since the pertinent statute
permitted the establishment of separate schools only for certain other
minority groups.2 6 Second, and of far greater historical significance,
the court held that the mere existence of segregated schools, regardless
of the comparability of the facilities, constituted a violation of the fed22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

64 F. Supp. at 546.
175 U.S. 528 (1899).
64 F. Supp. at 546 (citing Cummings, 175 U.S. at 545).
Id at 547.
See note 3 supra.
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eral constitution.27

As noted earlier, the Mendez court had no case law on which to base
its second holding. Instead, it used many of the arguments that had
been made by unsuccessful plaintiffs in the ninety-seven years since
Roberts v. City of Boston.2" The Mendez court found that "[a] para-

mount requisite in the American system of public education is social
equality. '29 Such social equality did not exist in Orange County because "the methods of segregation

. . .

foster[ed] antagonisms in the

children and suggest[ed] inferiority among them where none exist[ed ."' 3 ° The court, for these reasons, issued an injunction against the
3
defendant school districts halting the operation of segregated schools. '
The district court opinion placed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in a difficult position. In reviewing the lower court holding, the circuit
court in Westminister SchoolDistrict v. Mendez,32 passed on the issue of

school segregation for the first time. The seven judges who heard the
case were being asked to affirm a district court judge who had disregarded a half-century of United States Supreme Court cases. 33 The
court of appeals was not ready to go quite that far, but it apparently did
not want to expressly endorse the "separate but equal" doctrine by reversing the lower court.
Arguments for both sides in the case attempted to draw the appellate
court into basing its decision on an examination of the "separate but
equal" doctrine. The school districts claimed that their system of operating equal segregated schools had been validated by Plessy and its
progeny.34 On the same "separate but equal" battleground, but in the
opposite trench, were two amicus curiae briefs that urged the court to
follow the lead of the district court judge in breaking from past case
law.

35

The court, however, refused to enter the Plessy debate. The Supreme
Court cases were deemed not to be controlling. They were distinguished by the fact that those cases had all approved of state statutes
that mandated separate facilities, while the segregation in Mendez was
27. 64 F. Supp. at 549.
28. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text.
29. 64 F. Supp. at 549.
30. Id
31. Id at 551.
32. 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947). See note 18 supra.
33. Many national interest groups filed amicus curiae briefs in support of a complete
affirmance. One such brief was co-authored by now Justice Thurgood Marshall, then of the
NAACP. Id at 775.
34. Id
35. Id at 780.
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not based on any state law but solely on actions of the local school
districts.36 The court likewise rejected the invitation by the amicus
briefs to be as independent as the lower court had been. The appellate
court extolled the virtues of judicial restraint:
[J]udges must ever be on their guard lest they rationalize outright legislation under the too free use of the power to interpret. We are not tempted
by the siren who calls to us that the sometimes slow and tedious ways3 7of
democratic legislation is no longer respected in a progressive society.
The court did affirm the Mendez decision, but it did so only on the
state law grounds expressed in the district court opinion.38 Since the
California legislature had enacted statutes authorizing the segregation
in schools of certain minority groups, the court reasoned, the legislature
had intended to prohibit the segregation of any groups not mentioned
in the statute. 39 The court thus concluded that the actions of the school
districts in unlawfully discriminating against Mexicans were in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses 4 0 of the fourteenth amendment. It seems clear that had the segregation practices at
issue been expressly authorized by state statute, the court of appeals
would have reached a different result.4"
Gonzales v. Sheey 42 presented facts similar to those in Mendez. All
children of Mexican or Latin descent in Tolleson Elementary School
District were required to attend a school separate from the white children. However, Gonzales was distinguishable from Mendez in two significant ways. First, the judge found a "substantial inequality in the
accommodations" of the separate schools. 4 3 Second, Arizona law per36. Id
37. Id
38. Id at 780-81. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
39. 161 F.2d at 780.
40. Id at 781.
41. At least one of the seven appellate judges apparently was dissatisfied with the limited
holding. Judge Denman, in a concurring opinion, spoke out strongly against the "vicious
principle" advocated by the school districts:
[T]he descendants of an ancient Mesopotamian nation, whose facial characteristics still
survived in the inspiring beauty of Brandeis and Cardozo -

the descendants of the

nationals of Palestine, among whose people later began our so-called Christian civilization, as well could be segregated and Hitler's anti-semitism have a long start in the

country which gave its youth to aid in its destruction.
Id at 783 (Denman, J., concurring). In addition, Judge Denman saw possible criminal violations in the actions of the school districts and directed "the attention of the senior judge of
the Southern District of California and the foremen of its grand juries. . . to the facts here
disclosed."

Id

42. 96 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Ariz. 1951).
43. Id at 1007.
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mitted such segregation."
The judge in Gonzales cited only two cases in his decision and, purposefully or not, misapplied both of them. In finding that
"[s]egregation of school children in separate school buildings because
of racial or national origin. . . constitutes a denial of the equal protection of the laws,"'4 5 the judge ruled that the court of appeals opinion in
Mendez was controlling. 46 He cited the court of appeals' opinion in
Mendez as authority but, in actuality, the Gonzales judge followed the
district court decision of Mendez in finding that the segregation "foster[ed] antagonisms in the children and suggest[ed] inferiority among
them."'4 7 Had Gonzales reached the court of appeals, the case might
have been affirmed by virtue of the finding of unequal separate schools.
On the other hand, the court of appeals might have held as well that the
maintenance of separate schools was valid since authorized by Arizona
law. Such a holding would have been consistent with the court's ruling
in Mendez.
Additionally, the judge in Gonzales cited McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents," a Supreme Court case decided less than a year earlier,
to support his holding that segregated schools are per se unconstitutional. McLaurin, however, does not stand for that proposition. Instead, it is one of the few pre-Brown Supreme Court decisions that
stressed the need for equal educational opportunities, although it did
not overrule the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy.4 9
The district court opinions in Mendez and Gonzales were the only
federal cases decided before 1954 to hold that separate schools are per
se unequal. Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to
take such a radical stand, its limited affirmance of Mendez nevertheless
44. Although no mention is made in the case of the status of Arizona law concerning
segregation, a statute in effect at the time peimitted, though did not require, segregated
schools. ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 54-430 (1939). See Leflar & Davis, Segregation in the Public

Schools-1953, 67 HARV. L. REv. 377, 378 n.3 (1954). Laws authorizing and even mandating segregated schools were upheld and enforced by the Arizona courts. See Harrison v.
Riddle, 44 Ariz. 331, 36 P.2d 984 (1934); Burnside v. Douglas School Dist., 33 Ariz. 1,261 P.
629 (1927); Dameron v. Bayless, 14 Ariz. 180, 126 P. 273 (1912). Even now, an Arizona
statute allows a school board of trustees to "[m]ake such segregation of groups of pupils as it
deems advisable." ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 15-442(B)(3) (West Supp. 1978).

45. 96 F. Supp. at 1008.
46. d at 1005.
47. Id at 1007. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
48. 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (black student admitted to state supported graduate school had to
be given same treatment as students of other races).
49. See also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948);
Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
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represented a significant departure from traditional judicial philosophy.
IV.

THE IMMEDIATE REACTION TO BROWN

Three years after the district court's opinion in Gonzales, Chief Justice Earl Warren spoke for a unanimous Supreme Court in Brown v.
Board of Education.5" Echoing the arguments of the unsuccessful
plaintiffs in Roberts, Ward, and Wong Him, as well as Justice Harlan's
dissent in Plessy and the district court opinions in Mendez and
Gonzales, the Court held that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 5 ' The segregation of certain students "from others
of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."52
Although the Brown Court noted that "segregation has long been a
nationwide problem, not merely one of sectional concern," 3 the decision had its greatest immediate impact in the South. Most of the initial
post-Brown litigation occurred in the Fifth Circuit5 4 and involved
school districts that were segregated under state constitutions and statutes.5 - By comparison, only one school segregation case was decided in
the Ninth Circuit during the first fifteen years following
Brown-Romero v. Weakley 6
Romero was a class action by black and Spanish-surnamed students
against two school districts and the Superintendent of Schools of Imperial County, California. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, in
drawing the boundary lines for elementary school districts, had created
a system of segregated schools. The decision by District Judge Hall
was quite similar to the decisions being handed down at that time by
the obstructionist judges of the Fifth Circuit.5 7 In denying injunctive
relief, he distinguished both Brown and the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
Zone

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id at 495.
Id at 494.
Id at 491 n.6.
The Fifth Circuit includes Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Canal
and Florida. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1976).

155. See Read, JudicialEvolution Of The Law Of School IntegrationSince Brown v. Board

ofEducation, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 7 (1975). For a discussion of recent Fifth Circuit
school desegregation cases, see Note, School Desegregation In The Fifth Circuit: The
Achievement of "Unitary"School Systems Through Some Not So Unitary Remedies, 7 CuM.

L. REv. 273 (1976).
56. 131 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Cal.), rev'd, 226 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1955).

57. See, e.g., Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955), which was decided two
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Mendez. Brown was found not to be controlling because it involved
state laws that required segregation, while the Romero plaintiffs com58
plained of "[o]nly a general course of conduct" by school officials.
Mendez was distinguished because it, unlike Romero, involved a "specific identified order" of the school district.5 9
The Romero court's refusal to grant an injunction was based on its
view that a decision on the issue would be improper until the plaintiffs
had presented their case to the California courts: "[T]he federal courts
should approach with caution, and avoid if possible, a decision on constitutional questions involving local social issues and policies, when the
result would be to tend to destroy the historic powers of the several
states."6 The court also felt justified in denying relief on the grounds
that it could not frame and enforce "an effective decree in equity without setting [itselfl up as a continuous and perpetual supervisory school
board." 6 '
In reversing the lower court decision, the court of appeals found that
Judge Hall had "clearly erred" in avoiding the constitutional issue
raised by the plaintiffs.62 The district court had no discretion to refuse
to consider the complaint:
One of the obvious purposes of the creation of right to litigate these civil
rights in a federal court is to enable a member of a minority group claiming race or color discrimination to choose either a court presided over by
a federal judge appointed by the President of the United States or a state
court, presided over by an elected judge.63
The court of appeals also refuted Judge Hall's contention that there
could be no effective decree inequity. The court quoted language from
the second Brown opinion,64 which was issued three weeks after the
district court decision in Romero. Brown II instructed district courts to
"retain jurisdiction" of a case during the transition to a constitutionally
acceptable school system.65 In remedying a constitutional violation, a
months after Romero: "The Constitution ... does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination." Id at 777.
58. 131 F. Supp. at 822-23.
59. Id at 823.
60. Id. at 832.
61. Id at 822.
62. Romero v. Weakley, 226 F.2d 399, 401 (9th Cir. 1955). The opinion was written by
Chief Judge William Denman who had written the strong concurring opinion in Mendez.
See note 41 supra.
63. 226 F.2d at 400.
64. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Brown II is best known for its command that school segregation be ended "with all deliberate speed." Id at 301.
65. Id
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district court could consider a "revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis."6 6
The performance of the Ninth Circuit courts between 1948 and 1955
was consistent, in a peculiar way, with respect to school desegregation.
The three district judges who were faced with the issue all displayed a
tendency to ignore precedent in their decisions. The court of appeals,
in the two decisions it issued, had to bring the cases back into line with
the then-current case law. The district court decisions in Mendez and
Gonzales foresaw the shift in the law and, in moving in that direction,
tended to disregard precedents to the contrary. The district court decision in Romero also conflicted with precedent; however, it was decided
after the law had been changed, and it attempted to place an obstacle in
the path of school desegregation. The court of appeals refused to allow
the district court to impede the implementation of Brown.67
The Ninth Circuit was not involved in the school desegregation controversy during the most active period of the civil rights movement. In
the South, desegregation of public schools was impeded by obstructionist judges. In the Ninth Circuit, it was stalled by a lack of cases.
V.

AN INCREASE IN LITIGATION

While Brown spurred desegregation litigation in the southern circuits, the catalyst in the Ninth Circuit was the Supreme Court's decision in Green v. County School Board.6 8 Green was the Supreme
Court's response to the southern school districts that had been exercising too much deliberation and too little speed in ending segregation.
Ten years after Brown I, the defendant school board was still maintaining a segregated school system, despite the fact that the county's population was fifty percent black and there was no residential segregation.
Finally, following the filing of the suit and the passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, the school board adopted a "freedom-of-choice" plan that
allowed students to choose which of the two previously segregated
schools they wanted to attend. Not surprisingly, no white students
66. 226 F.2d at 402 (quoting 349 U.S. at 300-01) (emphasis omitted).
67. The reaction against Brown in the Ninth Circuit was slight compared with the threats
of mob violence and the opposition of some inferior courts and state officials in the South.
The Supreme Court, however, stood firm. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958)
("[Llaw and order are not here to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their
constitutional rights.").
68. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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elected to change schools and only fifteen percent of the black students
transferred to the formerly all-white school.
The Supreme Court found the school board's actions to be inadequate. The Court held that under Brown II, school boards were
"clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."69 Inasmuch as thirteen
years had passed since the imposition of that duty, the time for deliberateness was gone, and the board was instructed to develop a plan "that
promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work
now."7 ° In rejecting the school board's "freedom-of-choice" plan, the
Court declared:
[T]he school system remains a dual system. Rather than further the dismantling of the dual system, the plan has operated simply to burden children and their parents with a responsibility which Brown II placed
squarely on the School Board. The Board must be required to formulate
a new plan and, in light of other courses which appear open to the Board,
such as zoning, fashion steps which promise realistically to convert
promptly to 7a1system without a "white" school and a "Negro" school, but
just schools.
Although the Green decision was aimed at ending Southern intransigence, it resulted in a resumption of desegregation litigation in the
Ninth Circuit. One year after Green, the Ninth Circuit decided Brice v.
Landis,7 2 the first school desegregation case to be reported in the circuit
in fourteen years. Brice was a suit by parents of students challenging
the validity of a desegregation plan designed by the Pittsburg (California) Unified School District. The plan called for the closing of an elementary school that had a 99% black enrollment and the busing of the
school's pupils to three other schools that had black enrollments of between 3.6% and 7.7%.
The parents claimed that the closing of an adequate school and the
busing of only black children were themselves discriminatory actions
because the burden of desegregation was being borne by only one race.
District Judge Sweigert agreed and enjoined the school district from
selling or leasing the school that was to have been closed. The school
board's busing plan would have resulted in the same implication of
racial inferiority that the Supreme Court found objectionable in
Brown. Under the plan,
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id at 437-38.
Id at 439 (emphasis in original).
Id at 441-42 (footnote omitted).
314 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Cal. 1969). See 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 488 (1970).
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[t]he minority children are placed in the position of what may be described as second-class pupils. White pupils, realizing that they are permitted to attend their own neighborhood schools as usual, may come to
regard themselves as "natives" and to resent the negro children bussed
into the white schools every school day as intruding "foreigners." It is in
this respect that such a plan, when not reasonably required under the
circumstances, becomes substantially discriminating in itself. This undesirable result will not be nearly so likely if the white children themselves
realize that some of their number
are also required to play the same role
73
at negro neighborhood schools.
After adopting the plaintiffs arguments, the Brice court cited Green
as authority for two holdings: 1) federal district courts have the power
to reject desegregation plans;74 and 2) because of the availability of alternative plans, the school district's plan was "not a good faith, reasonably adequate implementation of the constitutional principles
involved." 75
The decision in Brice v. Landis was based on a liberal interpretation
of the Supreme Court's desegregation opinions. The busing plan rejected in Brice could have been accepted as comporting with the Brown
and Green decisions. Read together, Brown and Green required that
school boards develop plans that would realistically and quickly work
to eliminate dual school systems. The school board's plan in Brice
seems to have satisfied the Green requirement of immediate effectiveness. The Brice court extended Green and Brown, however, by holding
that the method of achieving an integrated system could itself create a
feeling of inferiority and hence be invalid, even though it would effectively create a nonsegregated school system. Brice is a logical extension
of Green in that it follows the spirit of the Brown decisions, but the
ruling could as easily have gone the other way. 76
At about the same time that Brice was being decided in the Northern
District of California, Spangler v. PasadenaCity Board of Education7 7
73. 314 F. Supp. at 978. It is interesting to note that Judge Sweigert combined black and
Spanish-surnamed students into one "minority" classification in describing the ethnic population of the school district. 1d at 975. This particular issue was not decided by the
Supreme Court until four years later in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
The Court there held that black and Spanish-surnamed students could indeed be combined
to determine whether a school had too high a concentration of minority students. Id at 19598.
74. 314 F. Supp. at 977.
75. Id at 978.
76. See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 298 F. Supp. 213 (D. Conn. 1969),
affrd, 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970), where a case involving facts similar to those in Brice
yielded a different holding.
77. 311 F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
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was before the Central District Court. Unlike Brice, which was not
reviewed by a higher court, Spangler includes three reported district

court opinions,7 six at the circuit court of appeals level,79 and one
Supreme Court decision.8" It is both the best known and the most liti-

gated school desegregation case in the Ninth Circuit. Also, since Brice
dealt only with the validity of an integration plan, Spangler was the
first case in the circuit after 1955 to deal with the question of what

constitutes an unconstitutionally segregated school system. This fact
was significant because, at the time of the original district court deci-

sion in Spangler, the Supreme Court had dealt only with southern
school systems which had been segregated by state law.
The segregation existing in 1970 in the Pasadena Unified School Dis-

trict may have had a tenuous connection to California's segregation
laws,81 but its primary sources were other, nonstatutory factors. The
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, however, prohibits only that segregation which is the result of some form of state action.812 In the South, the enactment of statutes mandating segregation
satisfied the state action requirement. In the Ninth Circuit, beginning
with Mendez in 1946, the acts of the school boards, which were authorized to act by state law, constituted the state action.
The school board had acted consistently over the years in creating

and maintaining a segregated system of schooling at all levels. 83 This
was accomplished by assigning students to various schools according to
race,84 by segregating and discriminating against black teachers and
administrators,85 by selectively building or renovating schools in the
78. Id; 375 F. Supp. 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1974), a9'd,519 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated
andremanded,427 U.S. 424 (1976); 384 F. Supp. 846 (C.D. Cal. 1974), remanded,537 F.2d
1031 (9th Cir. 1976).
79. 415 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1969); 427 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943
(1971); 519 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1975), vacatedand remanded, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); 537 F.2d
1031 (9th Cir. 1976); 549 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1977); 552 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1977).
80. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
81. See note 14 supra.
82. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424,435-36 (1976); note 92 infra
and accompanying text.
83. The suit was brought originally as a class action to desegregate only the three public
high schools in Pasadena. The United States intervened and filed a complaint against the
entire Pasadena school system. Judge Real granted a motion to strike all of the United
States' complaint except that portion dealing with the three high schools. The Ninth Circuit
court of appeals reversed, see Spangler v. PasadenaCity Bd ofEduc., 415 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir.
1969), and allowed the suit to continue against the entire school system,
84. 311 F. Supp. at 507-08.
85. Id at 513-17. Judge Real found that a discriminatory hiring policy had an adverse
effect on the students: "Black students need to see that equal opportunities for black teachers exist in order to believe that equal opportunities for black students exist." Id at 517.
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district,86 and by ignoring state court decisions that called for integration.87
Because the Supreme Court had yet to decide what was state action
in a "northern" situation, Judge Real had no formula or standard with
which to work in deciding Spangler. Perhaps to avoid being reversed

by a higher court, the judge based his ruling, that the school board
would be required to desegregate Pasadena's schools, on a number of

legal theories. The strictest requirement for finding a constitutional violation, and the one that the Supreme Court has since adopted, is that
the segregation be caused by action of the school board and that the
school board act with the intent to cause segregation. Judge Real's
finding that the assignments of students were racially motivated satisfied this requirement.
But portions of Judge Real's opinion suggest that the mere existence

of segregation regardless of its origin, coupled with a failure of the
school board to act to desegregate, would be a constitutional viola-

tion.88 This standard currently enjoys the support of only a small minority on the Supreme Court.89
Judge Real was forced to rely on a variety of legal theories because

the Supreme Court had yet to instruct lower courts how to deal with
school systems that were not segregated because of state law. By the
time Spangler returned to the district court four years later,90 the
86. Id. at 517-19.
87. The California Supreme Court in 1963 held that the Pasadena schools had to be integrated, even if the school board was not responsible for the segregation: "The right to an
equal opportunity for education and the harmful consequences of segregation require that
school boards take steps, insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance in
schools regardlessof its cause." Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 881,
382 P.2d 878, 882, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606, 610 (1963) (emphasis added).
The failure of the school board to comply with the California court's orders prompted the
filing of the federal action. 311 F. Supp. at 511.
88. Judge Real wrote: "The chief significance of Brown is its holding that racially segregated public education is detrimental to school children. . . . Under the Fourteenth
Amendment a public school body has an obligation to act affirmatively to promote integration, consistent with the principles of educational soundness and administrative feasibility."
311 F. Supp. at 521. Judge Real also held that the school board had the duty to undo school
segregation caused by housing discrimination: "School boards may not build upon residential segregation, when that segregation is the result of either private or state enforced discrimination. . . . Defendants have a duty to attempt to overcome the effects of residential
segregation on student assignments." Id at 522. This holding, that a school board must
take affirmative action to integrate regardless of the cause of the segregation, is the view
taken by the California Supreme Court, (see Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal.
2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963), and note 137 infra) but has since been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. See text accompanying note 113 infra.
89. See note 113 infra.
90. The Spangler case reached the court of appeals immediately after Judge Rears ruling,
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Supreme Court had spoken on the issue of "northern" segregation.
VI.

DE JURE AND DE FACTO SEGREGATION

The most important school desegregation issue currently under con-

sideration in the Ninth Circuit is, without doubt, the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. It is now clear that the
Supreme Court considers a racially imbalanced school system caused

by racially "neutral" factors, such as residential patterns, to be de facto
segregation and not a constitutional violation. Only segregation caused
by intentional state action (de jure segregation) justifies the imposition
of the duty to integrate. This was not clear, however, at the time of the

first Spangler decision. But, one year after Spangler, the Supreme

Court, in Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education,9 first
discussed the de facto-de jure issue. The Court there stated that the

only unconsitutional segregation, hence the only segregation that has to
be remedied, is segregation caused by state action. "The objective today," Chief Justice Burger wrote, "remains to eliminate from the public
schools all vestiges of state-imposedsegregation." 9 2

In the Ninth Circuit district courts, the immediate reaction to Swann
was confused and far from consistent. Three separate cases were decided shortly after Swann, and each involved a different understanding
of the de jure-de facto distinction.
Soria v. OxnardSchool DistrictBoard of Trustees9 3 did not find the

"state-imposed segregation" requirement in Swann to be of great
significance. Instead, Judge Pregerson read Brown literally and cited

Judge Real in Spangler with approval. Brown had held that separate
but only a procedural matter was decided. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Real's decision
not to allow intervention by Pasadena parents who objected to the desegregation ruling and
the school board's acceptance of it. See Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd of Edtuc., 427 F.2d
1352 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971).
91. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Swann was anxiously awaited as a decision that would specify the
powers and obligations of the federal district courts in implementing the Brown mandate.
The Court noted that the lower courts had been forced "to improvise and experiment without detailed or specific guidelines." Id at 6.
92. Id at 15 (emphasis added). The Swann opinion was limited to the facts of the case, so
the question of the constitutionality of segregation caused by state action other than school
board discrimination was left open:
Our objective in dealing with the issues presented by these cases is to see that school
authorities exclude no pupil of a racial minority from any school, directly or indirectly,
on account of race; it does not and cannot embrace all the problems of racial prejudice,
even when those problems contribute to disproportionate racial concentrations in some
schools.
Id at 23.
93. 328 F. Supp. 155 (C.D. Cal. 1971), vacated, 488 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 951 (1974).
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schools are "inherently unequal" and violative of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, the district judge reasoned,
the mere fact that Oxnard's elementary schools were segregated meant
that the school district had the affirmative duty to provide a "racially
balanced school system." 94 Even though the cause of the segregation
was irrelevant to Judge Pregerson's ruling, and even though he claimed
his ruling was not in conflict with Swann, he did acknowledge that
other courts might require a finding of state causation. In case such a
finding was required, Judge Pregerson noted that there were "sufficient
'de jure overtones' established by the agreed-upon findings of fact...
to entitle plaintiffs to relief."9' 5
The de facto-de jure distinction was treated with equal deference in
Johnson v. San Francisco'Unfed School District.96 There, Judge Weigel noted that the distinction "may turn out to be insignificant." 9'
Judge Weigel had delayed action in the case while waiting for the
Swann decision.9" In response to Swann, he ordered the school district
to desegregate only after finding that "[f]or a long period of time there
has been and there now is dejure segregation in the San Francisco
public elementary schools." 9 9 However, since Swann did not define
"state-imposed segregation," Judge Weigel has been free to adopt a
very broad definition:
In the context of segregation, it means no more nor less than that the
school authorities have exercised powers given them by law in a manner
which creates or continues or increases substantial racial imbalance in the
of the motivation for it,
schools. It is this governmental action, regardless
00
which violates the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Thus, under Johnson, it is unconstitutional to simply "continue" segregation that already exists. The original cause of the segregation still
need not have been state-imposed.' 0 '
94. Id at 157.

95. Id
96. 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971), vacated, 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974).
97. Id. at 1319 n.8.
98. Id at 1325.
99. Id at 1323.
100. Id at 1319 (emphasis added).
101. Parents of Chinese-American children attempted to stay the district court's integration order, but their attempt was rejected by the Ninth Circuit and by Mr. Justice Douglas
sitting as Circuit Justice in Guey Heung Lee v. Johnson, 404 U.S. 1215 (1971).
Judge Weigel explained the importance of acceptance of the integration plan:
The Judgment and Decree now to be entered is of less consequence than the spirit of
community response. In the end, that response may well be decisive in determining
whether San Francisco is to be divided into hostile racial camps, breeding greater violence in the streets, or is to become a more unified city demonstrating its historic capacity for diversity without disunity.
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The third post-Swann decision was Gomperts v. Chase.'1 2 Gomperts,
like Johnson, required a finding of de jure segregation, however,
Gonqperts narrowly defined the dejure concept. Judge Schnacke found
1 3
that "[tihe schools of the district are clearly racially imbalanced,"'
and that "[t]he school district has, for many years, recognized the racial
imbalance."' 4 This would have been sufficient, under the Johnson
definition, to impose a duty on the school district to desegregate. But
Judge Schnacke employed a different definition of de jure segregation.
Such segregation must have "been planned, encouraged, fostered,
designed, or in some way created by law or by administrative action
under the color of law."'0 5 Judge Schnacke further explained what a
plaintiff had to show to obtain relief: "It is only when a board of education embarks on a course which is motivated by purposeful desire to
perpetuate and maintain racially segregated schools that the constitutional rights of those affected have been violated." 0 6
The Gomperts and Johnson decisions were clear signals that the
Supreme Court had more explaining to do on the issue of de jure segregation. They were two cases with similar facts, decided in the same
judicial district only ten days apart, and both involved the issue of de
jure segregation. Yet, they yielded opposite results. The differentiating
factor was the definition of de jure segregation. The main difference
between the two definitions was the issue of segregative intent. Judge
Weigel in Johnson claimed that "regardless of the motivation," any action by a school board that led to segregation was unconstitutional.
Judge Schnacke in Gomperts, on the other hand, felt that such action
by a school board was unconstitutional only if "motivated by purposeful desire" to segregate.
339 F. Supp. at 1323.
102. 329 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Cal. 1971). For some reason, Swann was never cited in
Gomperis, but its influence is apparent.
103. Id at 1193.
104. Id at 1194.
105. Id at 1195. Judge Schnacke went on to say that Brown did not prohibit "the maintenance of racially imbalanced schools, as the product of neighborhood mix or otherwise,
where that imbalance exists under laws or school board activity which is racially neutral."
Id
106. Id at 1196 (emphasis added). Judge Schnacke denied the plaintiffs an injunction
that would have halted the implementation of a watered-down school district integration
plan. The Ninth Circuit also denied the injunction, as did Mr. Justice Douglas acting as
Circuit Justice. 404 U.S. 1237 (1971). Douglas cited as his reason for denying the injunction
the fact that the case came before him only three days before the schools were scheduled to
open. He said that he would have issued the injunction if it were a case of "classical dejure
school segregation," but noted that "the precise contours of dejure segregation have not
been drawn by the Court." Id at 1238.

1979]

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

Except for ruling on two procedural matters in Spangler, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals had not decided a school desegregation case
since 1955. All of the interpretation of the recent Supreme Court cases
on the issue of what was a constitutional violation had been left to the
district courts in the Ninth Circuit. In 1972, however, the court of appeals evaluated the segregated condition of the Las Vegas elementary
schools in Kelly v. Guinn."°7
In Kelly, the Clark County School District appealed a district court
ruling that the school district had an affirmative duty to integrate its
elementary schools. The school district claimed that, under Swann, it
should be required to integrate only if it had caused the racial imbalance. It then maintained that the racial imbalance resulted not from
any discriminatory acts by the school district, but because the children
were assigned to the schools nearest their homes and the county was
residentially segregated.
Kelly held that Swann did indeed require a finding of de jure segregation before a school district could be ordered to integrate. 0 This
finding was clearly contrary to the district court rulings in Spanglerand
Soria that the cause of the segregation was irrelevant in determining
whether a constitutional violation existed. On the issue that distinguished Johnson from Gomperts, ie., whether de jure segregation
meant that the school district must have intended to segregate its
schools, Kelly was less clear.
The court affirmed the district court's holding that the Clark County
elementary schools were unconstitutionally segregated. Its affirmance
was based on the fact that the school district had "used its power to
aggravate segregation in elementary schools." 9 This finding was neutral on the issue of the school district's intent since its power could have
been used either intentionally or unintentionally to aggravate segregation. The Kelly court did hold, however, that "the school district's
purpose in constructing, renovating, and abandoning schools was to
limit integration at the elementary level.""' Although the court thus
found evidence of discriminatory motivation, it nevertheless based its
finding of a constitutional violation on grounds that did not include a
requirement that segregative intent be present.
107. 456 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973). This case and Gonza-

les v. Sheely, 96 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Ariz. 1951), are the only Ninth Circuit school desegregation cases to deal with school systems outside California.
108. 456 F.2d at 105.
109. Id at 108.
110. Id (emphasis added).
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DE JURE SEGREGATION DEFINED

The requirement of de jure segregation, which caused confusion in
the Ninth Circuit from the time of its announcement in Swann, was
clarified by the Supreme Court in Keyes v. School District No. 1.L I
Since it was the first "northern" school desegregation case (I e., the first

case in which the school system had not been segregated by state law),
Keyes was more specific in defining de jure segregation. The Court

sided with the Gomperts"I decision in ruling that it was unconstitutional for a school system to be segregated only if the school board had
a segregative motivation in maintaining such a system: "We emphasize
that the differentiating factor between dejure segregation and so-called

to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent
defacto segregation
' 13

to segregate."
4
Keyes had an immediate impact in the Ninth Circuit. The Soia"

case, which had been decided by the district court immediately after
Swann,"I5 was reviewed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals a few
months after the Keyes decision. 1 6 The district court had held that,
regardless of the cause of the segregation, Oxnard's elementary schools
had to be integrated. It made the alternative finding that there were
"de jure overtones" in the segregation which created a constitutional
violation. The court of appeals, relying on Keyes, rejected the district

court's rationale and remanded the case for a ruling on the issue of
segregative intent. Despite finding "a pattern of racial and ethnic disI 11. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). In addition to its ruling on de jure segregation, Keyes held that
black and Spanish-surnamed students could be combined into one "minority" category, see
note 73 supra, and that de jure segregation in a "meaningful portion" of the school district
creates a presumption that the entire school system is unconstitutionally segregated. 413
U.S. at 208. However, only the definition of dejure segregation has been a significant factor
in Ninth Circuit cases. "
112. See notes 102-06 supra.
113. 413 U.S. at 208 (original emphasis) (footnote omitted). Mr. Justice Powell wrote a
separate opinion in which he argued that the de jure requirement should be abolished:
Unwilling and footdragging as the process was in most places, substantial progress toward achieving integration has been made in Southern States. No comparable progress
has been made in many nonsouthern cities with large minority populations primarily
because of the defacto/dejuredistinction nurtured by the courts and accepted complacently by many of the same voices which denounced the evils of segregated schools in
the South. But if our national concern is for those who attend such schools, rather than
for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history rather than present reality, we must recognize that the evil of operating separate schools is no less in Denver than in Atlanta.
Id at 218-19 (footnotes omitted).
114. See notes 93-95 supra and accompanying text.
115. See id.
116. 488 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974).
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proportion within Oxnard's elementary schools,""' 7 the Soria court
held that the finding of "de jure overtones" was "inconclusive and

vague on the question of the School Board's segregative intent."' " 8

.

In 1974, the Spangler case returned to Judge Real's courtroom." 9
Four years earlier, when it had been held that Pasadena's schools were

unconstitutionally segregated, the de jure-de facto issue had not yet
crystalized.' 2 ° Judge Real, at that time, had stated that a school board

had the duty to desegregate if its system was racially imbalanced. He
had ruled not only that the segregative intent of a school board was
irrelevant, but also that it made no difference whether the segregation

was even caused by a school board's actions. 2 ' In 1974, although it

was not directly at issue, Judge Real reiterated this position and chal-

lenged the Swann and Keyes de jure rulings:
There appears to be, in logic, no distinction between de jure and de facto
segregation for our purposes. "De jure" and "de facto" are only adjectives that give some attempted "legal" distinction to the aims of [Brown I
and Brown I] that "segregation" denies equal educational opportunity122
The issue in the 1974 Spangler case was whether the district court

retained the authority to enforce its order of 1970. That order had included a desegregation plan and an injunction prohibiting the board of

education from maintaining any school in which a majority of the students belonged to any minority group. Judge Real found that "compliance was literal for only the first academic year" and that, since then,

five schools had violated the "no majority of any minority injunction."

23

The judge denied the requested relief from the 1970 court or-

der, stating that to dissolve the injunction would "surely be to sign the
death warrant of the [desegregation plan] and its objectives.

' 24

117. Id at 580.
118. Id at 586. The court of appeals opinion stated: "Nor has the state of California or
the city of Oxnard ever maintained a 'dual school system.'" Id at 580. This statement is
incorrect. As late as 1947, California laws allowed segregated schools. See notes 3 & 14
supra. These laws are hardly difficult to discover; they were discussed in Guey Heung Lee v.
Johnson, 404 U.S. 1215, 1215 (1971) and in Romero v. Weakley, 131 F. Supp. 818, 835-36
(S.D. Cal. 1955).
119. 375 F. Supp. 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded,427 U.S. 424 (1976).
120. See notes 77-90 supra and accompanying text.
121. See note 88 supra.
122. 375 F. Supp. at 1307 n.10 (citations omitted).
123. Id at 1306.
124. Id at 1309. Later that year, Judge Real held the board of education in contempt of
court for failure to comply fully with the order. 384 F. Supp. 846 (C.D. Cal. 1974),
remanded,537 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1976).
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De jure segregation was the issue when the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed the Johnson case.' 25 Johnson was one of three district court cases decided immediately after Swann established the re-

quirement that "state-imposed segregation" be found. The definition
of de jure adopted by Judge Weigel ignored the intent behind the
school board's actions.' 26 The court of appeals held this definition im-

proper in light of Keyes and the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Keyes
in Soria. The case was remanded for a ruling as to whether "the school

students
authorities had intentionally discriminated against minority
27
by practicing a deliberate policy of racial segregation." 1
The requirement that segregative intent be found created a heavy

burden for plaintiffs in federal school desegregation cases, but proof of
such an intent is not impossible. In Ybarra v. City of San Jose,2 ' the

Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a complaint alleging unconstitutional school desegregation caused by the combination of a discriminatory administration of zoning ordinances and a "neighborhood school
policy."
The Ybarra court ruled that a "neighborhood school policy" could

not automatically bar all relief.'2 9 The court also held that the intentionally segregative actions the plaintiff was required to prove need not
necessarily be those of school authorities, but might be "the acts of
other state agencies."' 3 ° Thus, a school board might be charged with
an affirmative duty to integrate if the state intentionally causes segre-

the board's complete innogated residential areas, notwithstanding
3
cence with respect to segregative acts.' '

In 1976, the Spangler case became the first Ninth Circuit school de125. 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974), vacating,339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971). See notes
96-101 supra and accompanying text.
126. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
127. 500 F.2d at 351 (quoting Soria, 488 F.2d at 585). As in Soria, see note 118 supra, the
Ninth Circuit ignored past California segregative statutes: "The schools of the District have
never been subject to a statutorily imposed 'dual school system' separating blacks from
whites." 500 F.2d at 350.
128. 503 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1974).
129. Id at 1043.
130. Id The court said that "relief might be granted," as opposed to "should be granted,"
if other state agencies had intentionally caused segregated schools. This particular question
has not been expressly decided by either the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit.
131. One year later the school authorities were sued in Diaz v. San Jose Unified School
Dist., 412 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In that case, the same judge who had dismissed the
complaint in Ybarra denied relief to the plaintiffs. Although he found "marked racial imbalance" in San Jose's schools and felt that the imbalance was "perpetuated" by state action,
he held that there was no constitutional violation because the school district "never acted
with segregative intent." Id. at 329, 335.
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segregation case to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Instead of dealing with the question of segregative intent, which had been the primary
legal issue in the circuit, the Court in PasadenaCity BoardofEducation
v. Spangler'3 2 defined the scope of a district court's jurisdiction once a
constitutional violation is found. Judge Real had denied relief from his
earlier desegregation order and injunction prohibiting the maintenance
of any schools with a majority of any minority. 3 3 The court of appeals, by a two-to-one vote, had affirmed.' 3 4
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the implementation of the
desegregation plan and the compliance with the court order for one
year had "established a racially neutral system of student assignment."' 3 5 This ended the de jure segregation complained of in the original action. Since the constitutional violation had been remedied, the
Court reasoned, the district court's jurisdiction had expired. Any subsequent racial imbalance had to be evaluated as a new case, with the
plaintiffs having a renewed burden of showing intentional segregation
by the school board after the original violation had been remedied:
Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required
to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student
bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished
discrimination through official action is eliminated from the
and racial
36
system. 1
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The history of school desegregation in the Ninth Circuit defies generalization. In its first case, the circuit faithfully followed the established
"separate but equal" doctrine, while in its last the court was reversed
by the Supreme Court for exceeding its power to order integration.
The district court in Mendez declared segregated schools unconstitutional eight years before Brown, while the district judge in Romero refused to integrate a segregated school system one year after Brown.
Although the circuit's school desegregation cases, taken together,
form no discernible pattern, the recent cases send a clear message. By
strictly adhering to Supreme Court guidelines, the Ninth Circuit is virtually assured of not having to hear any new school desegregation
cases. Plaintiffs challenging the maintenance of segregated schools in
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

427 U.S. 424 (1976).
See notes 123-24 supra and accompanying text.
519 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated andremanded, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
427 U.S. at 434.
Id at 436 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 31-32).
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California, where all but two of the Ninth Circuit cases have
originated, will not bear the burden of proving intentional segregation
on the part of a school board; the only showing required by the California Supreme Court is that the schools are segregated.' 37 While a violation of the federal constitution can only be proved with elusive
evidence of a state of mind, a state constitutional violation can be established by school enrollment statistics. The difference is one of philosophy. The United States Supreme Court does not believe a school
board should be forced to undo that which it did not intentionally do.
The California Supreme Court, however, focuses on the evil of segregation and imposes upon school boards the duty to eliminate it from the
school system, regardless of its cause.
David S. Ettinger

137. See note 87 supra. The California Supreme Court reaffirmed its Jackson decision in
Crawford v. Board of Educ., 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976): "[Iln
this state school boards do bear a constitutional obligation to take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in the public schools, whether the segregation be de facto or de jure in origin." Id at 290.

